

Appendix for:
The Electoral Implications
of Coalition Policy-Making

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A1: Cabinets evaluated by respondents in sample surveys

Table 1: Cabinets included in surveys

Country	Cabinet	Coalition	Tenure
Denmark	A.F. Rasmussen I	V-K	2001-2005
Germany	Shröder II	SPD-Green	2002-2005
Germany	Merkel I	CDU-SPD	2005-2009
Netherlands	Lubbers I	CDA-VVD	1982-1986
Netherlands	Lubbers II	CDA-VVD	1986-1989
Netherlands	Lubbers III	CDA-PVDA	1989-1994
New Zealand	Clark III	L-PP	2005-2008
Norway	Bondevik II	KRF-H-V	2001-2005
Sweden	Bildt	M-KD-FP-C	1991-1994

A2: A survey experiment validating the perceived compromise proxy

The opening slide introduces the subjects to the novel country and its parties. The subjects were asked to place the parties on a 0-10 scale in a matrix format. The ordering of the parties was randomized in both the text and the grid where the subjects evaluated them.

A new country has been formed. In this country there are several political parties: the Christian Democratic Party, the Green Party, the Conservative Party, the Liberal Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Independence Party, and the Labour Party.

Using only the information given above, please answer the following question about the parties in this new country: On a scale of 0-10, where 0 is the most left and 10 is the most right, where would you place each of the parties? If you do not know, please guess.

The subjects were then introduced to the cabinet, their policy positions, and their policy-making conflict. All subjects received the same opening paragraph of the vignette. The vignette reveals the identity of the cabinet to the subjects, informs them that the parties have both promised their supporters that they would reduce government spending, but the parties pursue this overarching promise in different fashions — the first party prefers increased privatization of health care and the increase of university tuitions and the second prefers alternative routes to reducing government spending.

This country is currently being governed by a coalition of the Christian Democratic Party and the Independence Party. Before the election, the Christian Democratic Party campaigned on a platform of reducing government spending by increasing the role of the private sector in providing health care and allowing universities to raise their tuitions. The Independence Party also campaigned on a platform of reducing government spending, but promised its supporters that it would not allow the private sector to have greater role in health care, would keep university tuitions at their current levels, and would find other ways to reduce spending.

After being presented with the identity of the coalition, and their common and differing policy promises, the respondents were presented with one of three randomly assigned policy-making outcomes. The first treatment (“Compromise”) informed the subjects that the parties were able to reach a compromise and pass a new budget, but gave no specifics on the terms of that compromise. Thus, respondents learned that both parties were able to deliver on their promise of reducing government spending, but could not know who gave what in the negotiations. The second treatment (“Logroll”) informed the subjects that the parties were able to strike a deal and noted that tuitions were increased, but there was no health care privatization. Thus, respondents learned that both parties were able to deliver on their promise of reducing government spending and that each party gave and received one policy concession in working toward the larger goal. In the third treatment (“Stalemate”), the parties were unable to reach a compromise and pass a policy. Thus, respondents learned that both parties were unable to deliver on their promise of reducing government spending, but neither made a concession in the bargaining process. Note that in no treatment is there a clear “winner” or “loser,” yet the signals of compromise and conflict are clearly differentiated with the Compromise and Logroll treatments on one side and the Stalemate treatment on the other.

1. [compromise] When it came time to set a budget, the Christian Democrats and Independence Party were flexible on their promises regarding health care and education and were able to reach a compromise.
2. [logroll] When it came time to set a budget, the Christian Democrats and Independence Party negotiated a trade. The Christian Democrats and Independence Party agreed on a budget that raises tuitions but does not increase the role of the private sector in health care provision.
3. [stalemate] When it came time to set a budget, the Christian Democrats and Independence Party both held fast to their promises regarding health care and education and were therefore unable to agree on a new budget.

The respondents were then asked to evaluate how well each party represented their supporters. The order of the parties was randomized within the text and evaluation matrix.

On a scale of 1–5, how well do you think the Christian Democrats and Independence Party represented the preferences of their supporters?

Finally, the subjects were asked to place all of the parties on the 0-10 left-right scale once again, and once again, the order of the parties was randomized. We can evaluate how the policy-making treatments influenced the subjects perceptions of the ideological locations of the parties by simply comparing the pre and post treatment perceptions. Because the parties are treated equally in the vignettes, i.e., they both compromise or both stand strong, we can, for simplicity, simply compare the cardinal distance that the subjects perceive between the parties pre and post treatment. If compromise causes them to update their perceptions of the ideological positions as more similar, we should see that distance shrink for subjects that received the Compromise and Logroll treatments, but not for those receiving the Stalemate treatment.

The model in Table 2 regresses the change ($\text{distance}_{\text{post}} - \text{distance}_{\text{pre}}$) in the perceived distance between the cabinet parties on the treatment the subject was exposed to, where Compromise serves as the baseline treatment. The expectation is a negative effect for Compromise and Logroll treated and a positive or neutral effect for Stalemate treated. That is indeed what the results show. Those that received the Compromise treatment updated the parties as significantly more similar and Logroll treated updated in a statistically indistinguishable manner, while Stalemate treated subjects update the parties as further apart.

For those that interested in the determinants of the *Perceived Compromise* measure used in the main analysis, the following model attempts to unpack the measure across individual, party, and contextual levels.

The model in Table 3, below, explores individual and contextual variation in *Perceived Compromise*. Included covariates are the distance each respondent perceives between themselves and each of their cabinet parties, their perceptions of the cabinet’s economic management, their level of political interest, whether or not they supported the cabinet in the previous election, their level of ideological extremism, whether or not they place themselves between cabinet partners spatially, whether or not they are evaluating a junior cabinet partner, and the cabinet’s duration in days (logged). As one may suspect, parties in longer lasting cabinets tend to be viewed as more compromising, all

Table 2: Model of change in perceived distance of cabinet parties from vignette experiment — Baseline category is the Compromise Treatment.

	Covariate	Parameter	Standard Error
Estimates	Stalemate Treatment	0.628	(0.140)
	Logroll Treatment	0.213	(0.140)
	U.K. Group	0.379	(0.116)
	Intercept	-0.339	(0.118)
Data Break	N		1417
	Log Likelihood		-3098.34

else equal. The model also suggests that junior partners are perceived as more compromising than prime ministers, although these effects are of middling statistical significance. Finally, there is no statistically discernible effect of political interest, prior support, or even perceived economic performance on perceptions of compromise. Though these results are interesting and seem to comport with what our expectations would, particularly concerning junior partners and cabinet duration, I caution readers not to take these results as gospel — there is simply not enough contextual variation to be sufficiently confident in the contextual-level effects.

Table 3: Exploring *Perceived Compromise*. Model is a hierarchical linear regression. Higher values of the DV denote greater perceived compromise.

Covariate	Estimates
Intercept	-7.568 (2.486)
CMP Compromise	-0.031 (0.044)
Preelectoral Coalition	0.024 (0.107)
$\ln(\text{Cabinet Duration})$	0.999 (0.348)
Prior Cabinet Supporter	-0.067 (0.038)
Junior Partner	0.126 (0.101)
Economy	-0.015 (0.018)
Distance	-0.176 (0.018)
Political Interest	0.065 (0.018)
Respondent Extremity	-0.007 (0.013)
Between Cabinet Parties	0.736 (0.044)
Random Intercept: $var(\text{Respondent})$	0.783
Random Intercept: $var(\text{Party})$	0.219
N	12772
$\log(\text{likelihood})$	-24447
AIC	48923

A3: Recent electoral results

Table 4: Margin of victory in parliamentary elections held in coalitional systems of Western Europe over last three years — common names are used when possible.

Country	Year	Winner	Runner up	Margin
Belgium	2010	New Flemish Alliance	Socialist Party (Walloon)	3.70%
Czech Republic	2010	Social Democratic Party	Civic Democratic Party	1.86%
Netherlands	2010	Liberal Party	Labor Party	0.90%
Sweden	2010	Social Democratic Party	Moderate Party	0.60%
U.K.	2010	Conservative Party	Labor Party	7.10%
Cyprus	2011	Christian Democratic Party	Communist Party	1.61%
Denmark	2011	Liberal Party	Social Democratic Party	1.90%
Finland	2011	Liberal Party	Social Democratic Party	1.30%
Ireland*	2011	Fine Gael	Labor Party	16.60%
Poland	2011	Civic Platform	Law and Justice	9.29%
France [†]	2012	Socialist Party	Union for a Popular Movement	2.23%
Greece [‡]	2012	New Democracy	Radical Left Coalition	2.07%
Netherlands	2012	Liberal Party	Labor Party	1.80%
Italy	2013	Democratic Party	The Freedom of People	0.40%
Iceland	2013	Independence Party	Progressive Party	2.27%
Norway	2013	Labor Party	Conservative Party	4.04%
Germany	2013	CDU/CSU	Social Democratic Party	15.81%
Austria	2013	Social Democratic Party	Austrian People's Party	2.83%
Czech Republic	2013	Social Democratic Party	ANO 2011	1.80%

*The incumbent Fianna Fáil - Green Government was trounced, losing nearly 70% of their seats.

[†]First round results.


[‡]Incumbent was a “government of unity” including members of New Democracy and PASOK.

A4: Some experimental results

The original version of this manuscript was framed as investigating the relationship between compromise and perceptions of representational quality. To that end, part of the survey experiment discussed above was meant to assess the effect of the three treatments on perceptions of representation. As readers of this manuscript have pointed out that approach was oversimplifying a fairly nuanced relationship, the experimental results were removed from the main text. I report the results here for interested readers.

Recall, that the experiment described in section A2 presented subjects with a cabinet in a hypothetical country and a policy-making scenario. Subjects then received one of three randomized treatment outcomes to the impasse: a Compromise treatment, a Logroll treatment, and a Stalemate treatment. Respondents were then asked how well they believed each of the parties represented the preferences of their supporters on a scale of 1–5, where 5 indicates that they represented their supporters “quite well” and 1 indicates that they represented their supporters “not well at all.” Below, I present the results of three analyses of this data. The first is a pairwise comparison — a difference of means between each of the treatments, presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Pairwise comparison of treatment effects on perceived quality of representation from vignette experiment



The next analysis is an ordered probit model that takes into a few possibly confounding factors account. It is possible that some part of the vignette, such as the party names or the associated policies, could lead individual subjects to have more positive or negative associations with the policy positions of one or more of the parties. For example, some subjects may associate the label “Christian Democrat” with centrist policies. If these subjects also fancy themselves centrists, they may evaluate the Christian Democrats more favorably than the Independence Party. To account for this possibility, I include an indicator for party and the absolute distance between each subject’s left-right self-placement and their final left-right placement of each party. I also include an indicator for the country sample.

Table 5: Ordered probit model of perceived quality of representation from vignette experiment — Baseline category is the Compromise Treatment

	Covariate	Parameter	Standard Error
Coefficients	Stalemate Treatment	0.293	(0.087)
	Logroll Treatment	0.074	(0.089)
	U.K. Sample	0.112	(0.070)
	Independence Party	0.172	(0.070)
	Distance	-0.249	(0.036)
Intercepts	1 2	-1.912	(0.091)
	2 3	-0.451	(0.078)
	3 4	0.998	(0.080)
	4 5	2.681	(0.100)
Data Break	N		2666
	Log Likelihood		-3944.087

The results of both the raw pairwise comparison of means and the ordered probit model suggest that voters associate compromise with poor representation, thus supporting the general arguments made in the main text of the paper.

A5: A note on the imputation

As noted in the main text, the data have several missing values and we cannot simply assume that those values are randomly assigned. The missing values were imputed via multiple imputation as recommended by King et al. (2001). Below is a table describing the extent of the missingness across the sample surveys.

Table 6: Description of missingness in the panel surveys. The numbers represent the proportion of missing values across all variables used to construct the models presented in main and supplemental texts.

Survey	Missing
Denmark 01-05	0.030
Germany 02-05	0.059
Germany 05-09	0.029
Netherlands 82-86	0.092
Netherlands 86-89	0.097
Netherlands 89-94	0.064
Norway 02-05	0.019
New Zealand 05-08	0.186
Sweden 91-94	0.056

Clearly, New Zealand is an outlier here, however, the results remain if this survey is excluded (indeed, the data reveal more support for the hypotheses). The remaining surveys exhibit typical levels of missingness. Note that the imputations were performed with **Amelia II** (Honaker et al. 2011) and that number of imputations performed, 10, is twice the number recommended by, for example, Rubin (1987). The parameter estimates and standard errors presented in the main text are calculated according to Rubin (1987) and King et al (2001).

A6: Robustness Checks

Accounting for objective position

A reader of an earlier version of this manuscript raised concerns that my *Perceived Compromise* measure may not be picking up perceived compromise, but may be proxying for changes in perceived similarity resulting from real changes in party policy position. Though the literature suggests that voters are unresponsive to immediate changes in party policy position (Adams et al. 2010), the concern certainly deserves consideration. Thus, the model below includes a term called CMP Convergence, modeled after Perceived Compromise, and interacted with cabinet status. The measure, for some *Party A*, is: $|Party A_{cmp_1} - Party B_{cmp_1}| - |Party A_{cmp_2} - Party B_{cmp_1}|$, the difference in CMP positions of *Party A* at election one and *Party B* at election one less the difference in the CMP positions of *Party A* at election one and *Party B* at election two. To account for measurement error in the CMP codings (derived according to Lowe et al. 2010) the actual values used in the model are not the point estimates, rather, for each voter-party a random draw is taken from a normal distribution with mean and standard deviation equivalent to the point estimate and standard error of the CMP coding for that party. Because each model is estimated 10 times (one for each missing value imputation) and there are several thousand observations in each model, with tens of thousands of party of data at the voter-party level, we can be confident that we are modeling the majority of estimate error. As the table shows, the results are virtually identical to those presented in the main text. Further, the CMP covariates are statistically insignificant and substantively quite small, given that the CMP Convergence values have about one fifth the range of the Perceived Compromise measure, and add next to nothing to the model fit.

Table 7: Main model replication controlling for CMP change.

Covariate	Simple Model		Full Model	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Incumbent Coalition Party	-0.133 (0.239)	0.735 (1.264)	-0.088 (0.242)	0.822 (1.174)
Distance	-1.711 (0.058)	0.884 (0.072)	-1.706 (0.057)	0.874 (0.069)
Distance \times Incumbent	-0.584 (0.159)	0.908 (1.158)	-0.594 (0.164)	0.870 (0.905)
Economy \times Incumbent	0.357 (0.047)	0.090 (0.161)	0.347 (0.047)	0.063 (0.152)
Perceived Compromise \times Incumbent	-0.054 (0.021)	0.310 (0.083)	0.176 (0.096)	0.197 (0.425)
Distance \times Compromise \times Incumbent			-0.068 (0.032)	0.059 (0.109)
Economy \times Compromise \times Incumbent			-0.051 (0.023)	0.044 (0.083)
CMP Convergence \times Incumbent	-0.072 (0.079)	0.253 (0.603)	-0.071 (0.077)	0.188 (0.490)
$N(\text{choices})$	5640		5640	
$N(\text{total alternatives})$	48038		48038	
$\log(\text{likelihood})$	-9052.175		-9041.322	

Testing alternative mechanisms

An anonymous reviewer raised the point that the construction of the *Perceived Compromise* measure is such that there may be alternative mechanisms that are driving the empirical results. More specifically, (a) it could be the case that voters who perceive a party as compromising, tend to perceive them as compromising away, acquiescing to the demands of a cabinet that is more ideologically distant to the voter. As a result, these voters would likely perceive the party as being pulled away from them, making their policy position less attractive. Related to this concern is the idea that (b) voters simply have a distaste for parties that are inconsistent in their policy positions, thus, if a voter perceives a party as moving around the policy space (which would result in non-zero values of *Perceived Compromise*), they may be likely to punish them. Both of these alternative mechanisms could potentially drive the results reported in the manuscript, provided a few conditions are met in the distribution of the data. For concern *a* to manifest, it would have to be the case that a large majority of the sample would have to perceive acquiescing parties moving away from them or intransigent parties moving toward them. For concern *b* to manifest, it would have to be the case that a large majority of those perceiving movement in cabinet parties, would have to perceive those parties moving toward their partners. These conditions are not met.


First, to check on concern *a*, let's create a measure assessing movement away from the voter by simply calculating the distance the voter perceives between herself and the party at time 2, less the distance perceived at time 1 ($distance_2 - distance_1$). Thus, positive values indicate the voter perceived the party moving away her, negative values indicate the reverse. First, we can check the necessary condition that voters perceiving compromise also perceive, in general, that compromising party to be moving away from them. By plotting perceived compromise against the degree to which voters perceive cabinet parties moving away from them, we can see the proportion that fall into the diagonals (top right and bottom left). If that proportion is roughly equivalent or smaller than those falling on the off-diagonal, then we can likely reject a necessary condition for the effect.

Figure 2 does this and gives the proportions of the points falling into each of the quadrants (the remaining proportion are those with zero values). The plot reveals that more points fall into the off-diagonals, which suggests that parties perceived as compromising are also perceived as moving toward, rather than away from, the voter more often than not.

To check on concern *b*, we can consider the distribution of *Perceived Compromise*. Recall that, in order for concern *b* to manifest, a large majority of voters perceiving movement at all, would also have to perceive the party as moving closer to its partners, registering a positive value in the *Perceived Compromise* measure. Thus, the distribution of the measure must be skewed to the right of 0 for concern *b* to manifest. The measure is negatively centered (mean = -0.05), fairly balanced with 36% positive values (mean = 1.37) and 39% negative values (mean = -1.75), with the remaining values effectively 0. The measure has a skewness of -1.035 , thus, the type of asymmetrical, positively skewed distribution of *Perceived Compromise* that is necessary for concern *b* to manifest does not seem to be present.

To more certain that these alternative mechanisms are not driving the main model results, I reestimate the main model with the inclusion of variables constructed to get at these mechanisms.

Figure 2: Comparison of Perceived Compromise and Movement away from Voter



First, for concern *a*, I include the measure of perceived party movement away from the voter (used in the figure above) and interact it with cabinet status, perceived distance (at election 2), and economic performance. The results of this model are in Table 8 and they reveal continued support for the findings presented in the manuscript.

Next, to check concern *b*, I calculate a variable capturing the degree to which voters perceive a party as moving about the policy space, regardless of that the party’s status (cabinet/opposition), or the direction of change. This is simply the absolute difference in the voter’s perception of the party at election 1 and her perception of the party at election 2 ($|p_1 - p_2|$). This is then interacted with cabinet status, economic performance, and perceived distance. These variables are added to the original list of covariates and the model is reestimated to allow us to more directly understand the extent to which a preference for consistency may be powering the main results. The model results are reported in Table 9. The results imply that, as the reviewer suggested, voters seem to have a general distaste for variability in party positions, but that this is not powering the results from the main models – the parameter estimates of the original covariates are quite similar to those in the main model and the log odds ratios of incumbent support are effectively equivalent. In sum, the reviewer’s suspicions that voters may prefer parties with more consistent positions are supported, but this preference does not wash out (or even significantly condition) the manuscript’s main results. These results would certainly be interesting to analyze more deeply in future research.

Table 8: Main model controlling for party movement away from voter.

Covariate	Mean	(se)	SD	(se)
Incumbent Coalition Party	-0.594	0.189	0.890	0.481
Distance	-2.314	0.075	0.894	0.089
Incumbent \times Distance	-0.391	0.112	0.104	0.256
Incumbent \times Economy	0.316	0.046	0.085	0.160
Incumbent \times Perceived Compromise	0.121	0.085	0.197	0.234
Incumbent \times Distance \times Compromise	-0.053	0.030	0.023	0.089
Incumbent \times Economy \times Compromise	-0.047	0.024	0.033	0.067
Perceived Movement Away	0.702	0.079	0.408	0.331
Incumbent \times Movement Away	0.356	0.225	0.126	0.277
Distance \times Movement Away	0.031	0.014	0.050	0.060
Incumbent \times Distance \times Movement Away	-0.034	0.022	0.098	0.060
Incumbent \times Economy \times Movement Away	0.003	0.050	0.054	0.096
$N(\text{choices})$		5640		
$N(\text{total alternatives})$		48038		
$\log(\text{likelihood})$		-8474.577		

Table 9: Main model controlling for inconsistency of perceived party positions.

Covariate	Mean	(se)	SD	(se)
Incumbent Coalition Party	-0.361	(0.206)	0.580	(0.884)
Distance	-1.717	(0.059)	0.866	(0.804)
Incumbent \times Distance	-0.289	(0.081)	0.133	(0.303)
Incumbent \times Economy	0.274	(0.057)	0.069	(0.141)
Incumbent \times Perceived Compromise	0.078	(0.089)	0.177	(0.364)
Incumbent \times Distance \times Compromise	-0.075	(0.033)	0.060	(0.144)
Incumbent \times Economy \times Compromise	-0.055	(0.025)	0.039	(0.082)
Perceived Movement	-0.074	(0.032)	0.037	(0.083)
Incumbent \times Movement	-0.415	(0.145)	0.332	(0.450)
Distance \times Movement	-0.009	(0.006)	0.026	(0.036)
Incumbent \times Distance \times Movement	0.055	(0.011)	0.015	(0.028)
Incumbent \times Economy \times Movement	0.029	(0.036)	0.065	(0.072)
$N(\text{choices})$		5640		
$N(\text{total alternatives})$		48038		
$\log(\text{likelihood})$		-8988.114		

A7: Individual-level variation in random coefficients from main model.

Table 10: Aggregated linear regressions of individual random coefficient estimates on individual-level factors with survey fixed effects.

	Incumbent Party	Perceived Compromise	Distance	Incumbent Party * Distance	Economy	Perceived Compromise * Distance	Perceived Compromise * Economy
Intercept	-0.088 (0.022)	0.184 (0.063)	-1.682 (0.024)	-0.651 (0.095)	0.340 (0.017)	-0.068 (0.015)	-0.050 (0.012)
Respondent Extremity	0.007 (0.002)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.012 (0.004)	-0.008 (0.003)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Political Interest	0.004 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.018 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.003)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Partisanship	0.002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.018 (0.005)	0.000 (0.003)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Prior Cabinet Supporter	-0.050 (0.020)	-0.005 (0.003)	0.053 (0.011)	0.190 (0.054)	0.009 (0.010)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
DPEs 82-86	-0.019 (0.007)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.025 (0.018)	0.050 (0.020)	0.005 (0.005)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
DPEs 86-89	-0.031 (0.008)	0.002 (0.003)	0.049 (0.018)	0.054 (0.020)	0.004 (0.004)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
DPEs 89-94	-0.041 (0.011)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.018)	-0.016 (0.014)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.001)
GLES 02-05	-0.028 (0.008)	0.005 (0.004)	0.154 (0.023)	0.007 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)
GLES 05-09	-0.066 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.069 (0.021)	0.019 (0.016)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.001)
NES 02-05	-0.030 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.063 (0.017)	-0.047 (0.018)	-0.004 (0.004)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.001)
NZES 05-08	-0.037 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.072 (0.016)	0.029 (0.015)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
SES 91-94	0.013 (0.005)	0.003 (0.003)	0.049 (0.022)	-0.057 (0.021)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.001)
<i>N</i>	5570	5570	5570	5570	5570	5570	5570
<i>R</i> ²	0.211	0.010	0.040	0.165	0.246	0.007	0.009
<i>Log(likelihood)</i>	-7310.483	-11244.700	-1431.795	-489.955	-26135.540	-27931.140	-26034.130

A8: Exploring differences between prime ministerial and junior partner parties

Two anonymous reviews brought up the possibility of voters punishing parties differently, for the same level of compromise, according to their status (portfolio allocation, etc.). This warranted investigation, However, the data do not allow for a perfect one — there is simply no information in these surveys that would allow me estimate how important voters believe the individual parties are or what portfolios they believe the parties control. This is important because would voters would have to have some perceptions of importance or portfolio allocation in order to punish more or less accordingly, and it is unlikely that voters actually know the true allocation of portfolios. What we can do, however, is examine the differences in punishment according to the most readily observable characteristics of cabinet parties — characteristics that we can be reasonably confident voters have knowledge of — i.e., the difference in compromise punishment between prime ministers and junior partners. I have estimated this difference by reestimating a version of the full model from the main text that differentiates between PM and junior partner parties (replacing the incumbent interactions with PM and junior partner interactions) and then calculating the change in the predicted probability of support given a one standard deviation increase in perceived compromise for both prime ministerial and junior partner parties, just as I did to produce Figure 2 in the main text. I then compare the change in vote probability for prime ministerial and junior partner parties. Figure 3 shows the difference in differences in cardinal probabilities. That is, the change in the probability of supporting a prime ministerial party given a first difference increase in perceived compromise minus the change in the probability of supporting a junior partner party given a first difference increase in perceived compromise (as there may be several junior partner parties, I use the *mean* change in vote probability for all junior partners in each cabinet). Figure 4 shows the difference in percent change in vote probability given a first difference increase in perceived compromise, thus taking into account that the probability of voting for a prime ministerial party tends to be greater in general as they tend to be much larger than their junior partners.

Figure 3: The difference in punishment of prime ministerial and junior partner parties resulting from a one standard deviation increase in *Perceived Compromise*. This plot shows the difference in cardinal vote probabilities.




Figure 4: The difference in punishment of prime ministerial and junior partner parties resulting from a one standard deviation increase in *Perceived Compromise*. This plot shows the difference in percent change in vote probabilities.

