Do Women Make More Protectionist Trade Policy?

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Abstract

Women have more protectionist trade preferences than men. We assess whether this well-documented relationship between gender and protectionism in the mass public carries over into a relationship between women's political representation and (i) party platforms, and (ii) governments' trade policy choices. Looking across countries and over time, we demonstrate that with an increase in women's representation, political party trade policy positions become more protectionist. For government trade policy choices, we identify more nuanced results. The protectionist effect of women's representation is limited to the most visible products: consumption goods. Women's representation has no effect on intermediate inputs, where firm demands for trade liberalization are more pronounced and policy-makers are thus constrained in implementing a protectionist agenda. These findings contribute to scholarship on the descriptive-substantive representation link, add a new dimension to our understanding of trade politics, and demonstrate the importance of applying a gendered lens to international political economy research.

Women and men have divergent policy preferences across many issues. One of the most consistent gender divides in public opinion is in trade politics, where women are more protectionist than men—a difference observed across scores of countries in an array of research designs (Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Guisinger 2016). Taking this well-established gender gap in citizens' trade preferences as given,[1] we ask whether women's representation affects the trade policy positions of political parties and the trade policy choices of governments.

We present results from two studies. First, exploiting differences in the gender composition of political parties, we analyze party manifestos from three samples of elections to show that women's representation is associated with more protectionist party platforms. Second, we gather data on applied tariff rates and the share of seats held by women in the legislature and cabinet for 141 countries over almost three decades. Building on recent trade policy literature (Baccini, Dür and Elsig 2018; Osgood 2018; Betz and Pond 2019; Anderer, Dür and Lechner 2020) and work on corporate lobbying (e.g., Hillman and Hitt 1999), we document differential effects across product categories. For the products most visible to citizens — consumption products — increasing women's representation is associated with higher tariffs. This relationship does not hold for less visible products — intermediate inputs — where demands for trade liberalization from politically powerful firms place tight constraints on a protectionist agenda, and citizens are less likely to recognize and reward protectionism.

Our work draws on, and contributes to, scholarship on women's descriptive and substantive representation (Aldrich and Lotito 2020; Atchison 2015; Clayton and Zetterberg 2018; O'Brien and Piscopo 2018, 2019; Weeks 2022) and research linking inequalities in representation and economic globalization (Rickard 2015; Baccini and Weymouth 2021). We show that women's representation leaves an imprint even on issues that are not overtly gendered. At the same time, there are limits to these effects: the impact of descriptive representation is confined to products where observability is high and opposition from business interests is muted. Our findings also contribute to the literature in international political economy. Whereas traditional frameworks emphasized the role of firms in driving protectionism and of voters in pushing free trade, recent scholarship increasingly views large, politically influential firms as sources of trade liberalization and voters as advocates of protectionism (e.g., Betz and Pond 2019). We point to the visibility of products as a determinant of trade policy and identify political conditions that facilitate the implementation of a

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[1] Our design is agnostic about the source of the gender gap in trade preferences, which is an on-going scholarly debate. In the conclusion, we discuss how our results speak to explanations posited in the literature.

protectionist agenda. Finally, our study paves the way for future work on the gender gap in trade policy preferences and the effects of women's representation on economic and foreign policy.

The Gender Gap in Trade Preferences

The gender gap in mass attitudes towards protectionism was identified at least as early as Holsti (1996). Because lowering trade barriers exposes domestic producers to international competition, and therefore creates new wage pressures and displacement risk for domestic workers, subsequent efforts to explain this gap focused on gender differences in observed labor market risk or participation (e.g., Mayda and Rodrik 2005). However, the gap persists even when accounting for these factors, suggesting that the divide may be driven by differences in *perceptions* of the consequences of international trade. For example, women might be less exposed to economic ideas about the benefits of free trade and thus perceive trade as more threatening (Mansfield and Mutz 2009).

Disentangling informational explanations, Guisinger (2016) shows that different risk perceptions, rather than differences in knowledge about trade, are at the core of the gender gap in trade preferences. Brutger and Guisinger (2021) trace this gender gap to different responses to the labor market volatility induced by trade. Indeed, trade policy is often perceived as a main lever in the trade-off between prices and employment, and women tend to accept higher prices in exchange for reduced labor market volatility (Scheve 2004). Complementary work indicates that this increased risk sensitivity may be driven by gendered differences in competitiveness or willingness to relocate for employment (Mansfield, Mutz and Silver 2015), and experiences of labor market discrimination (Guisinger and Kleinberg 2021).[2] Indeed, both women workers and entrepreneurs[3] may enjoy fewer benefits from globalization.

While there is consensus that there is a gender gap in trade policy preferences, whether and how these differences affect policy outcomes is an open question. The only related research on the topic asks how women's suffrage reshaped trade policy and yields competing results. Hall, Kao and Nelson (1998) argue that women gaining the franchise in the United States led to a reduction in trade barriers, while De Bromhead (2018) examines thirty countries in the interwar period and concludes that women's suffrage

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[2]Part of the observed gender gap in survey responses is also driven by gendered differences in nonresponse probability (Kleinberg and Fordham 2018).

[3]Internationalization can benefit women-owned enterprises if they are able to access markets where discrimination is significantly lower than at home (Osgood and Peters 2017). But, systemic barriers limit women's ability to engage in, and fully benefit from, trade liberalization. For example, while almost 40% of small and medium-sized enterprises worldwide are women-owned businesses, only 15% of exporting firms are led by women (WTO 2017).

led to an increase in trade barriers. Neither examines the effects of women's representation in parties or government.

Linking Women's Representation and Protectionist Policy

Existing research suggests that women politicians should be more likely than men to support protectionism. First, women elites are more apt to share the policy preferences of women citizens (Wängnerud 2000; Clayton and Tang 2018). Indeed, our analysis of surveys of Members of the European Parliament and candidates running in national parliamentary elections in 11 countries suggest that like women in the electorate, women politicians are more protectionist than men (see Appendix SI.2). Second, even if women in the electorate and women elites have different policy preferences, mandate effects lead women in government to act on the specific interests of women in the polity (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008). For example, the only research to date on women's representation and trade policy shows that women in legislatures represent women's interests by using their influence to ameliorate gender-discriminatory apparel tariffs (Betz, Fortunato and O'Brien 2021). Though women in the electorate are unlikely to support specific tariffs that actively discriminate against them, they do prefer protectionism *overall*. Women elites, in turn, should advance more protectionist platforms and policies. In fact, an analysis of roll call votes on free trade agreements in the U.S. House of Representatives lends support to this expectation (see Appendix SI.2). [4]

We begin by examining the effects of women's representation on parties' policy platforms. Women's influence here is a necessary condition for their influence on government trade policy — party platforms are antecedent to government action. This analysis also allows us to evaluate, across many countries and years, whether gender differences in trade preferences survive the political selection process. Given existing research on the impact of women's presence in parties on their policy positions (e.g., Kittilson 2011; Weeks 2022), we expect that *women's representation is associated with more protectionist statements on party policy platforms.*

We next examine whether gender differences in representation leave a mark on trade policy, focusing on

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[4]As noted by an anonymous reviewer, women politicians may instead/also be representing the concerns of women entrepreneurs—who are less likely to benefit from globalization—and may thus be less focused on reducing barriers to trade as compared to male representatives. Regardless, these preferences for protectionism may only manifest if women in parties and government are both willing and able to influence trade policy platforms and outcomes. We also note the possibility, raised by a second reviewer, that this relationship may be a function of positive selection by voters—that voters recognize a gender gap in trade preferences among politicians and then select more women into office to increase protectionism. This account subsumes our more limited explanation.

tariffs. Here, existing work offers less conclusive expectations. On the one hand, a large body of research finds correlations between women's descriptive and substantive representation, and documents women legislators' (Barnes 2016; Barnes, Beall and Holman 2021; Betz, Fortunato and O'Brien 2021; Clayton and Zetterberg 2018; Franceschet and Piscopo 2008) and cabinet members' (Atchison 2015) efforts on behalf of women. On the other hand, trade policy can be subject to intense political conflict. Even if gender differences in the mass public result in differences in party platforms, women's descriptive representation may have a more limited effect on government policy.

We thus expect a nuanced relationship between women's representation and tariff rates. Specifically, we posit that women's presence has different effects across products, depending on their visibility to citizens. Visibility is highest for consumption products, such as automobiles, which citizens encounter in their daily lives. It is lowest for intermediate inputs used by firms in the production process, like drive-axles or airbag inflators, which citizens rarely observe directly. Visibility in turn shapes the politics surrounding trade policy on consumption products and intermediate inputs for two related reasons.

First, because of their visibility, consumption products are the most politically expedient place to implement a protectionist agenda. It is easier for politicians to portray protectionism as benefitting domestic producers of tangible goods familiar to consumers than the producers of inputs that most consumers never encounter directly. Of course, higher tariffs on consumption products might lead to higher household expenditures and therefore a preference for lower tariffs. Yet, the consumption effects of trade frequently play only a limited role in citizens' evaluations of trade policy (Hiscox 2006; Bearce and Moya 2020), likely because few are aware of the link between tariffs and prices (Rho and Tomz 2017; Davenport, Dorn and Levell 2021) and many (including women in particular) are supportive of higher prices in exchange for economic stability (Scheve 2004). These findings suggest that policy-makers can implement a protectionist agenda without fear of immediate reprisals from price-conscious citizens — and instead garner increased support from protectionist voters.

Second, firm lobbying tends to be more intensive and effective on intermediate inputs, which places more constraints on a protectionist agenda. Recent work shows that multinationals and importing firms dominate lobbying on trade policy, including in the context of trade agreements, pushing for lower tariffs for intermediate inputs in their production process (Osgood 2018).[5] This is also reflected in trade policy

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[5]Similarly, for the U.S., Kim (2017) shows that the role of large firms in lobbying for tariff reductions falls mostly on differentiated products and products with low substitution elasticity; this stands in contrast to consumption products, which are often homogeneous. While trade agreements also may create support by exporting firms for tariff cuts on consumption

choices. Across countries, both in the context of unilateral trade policy and in reciprocal trade agreements, we observe lower tariffs and faster tariff cuts on intermediate inputs than on consumption products (Baccini, Dür and Elsig 2018; Betz and Pond 2019; Anderer, Dür and Lechner 2020; Shapiro 2021).

Several explanations account for this pattern. In contrast to consumer goods, production inputs are frequently sourced by a small number of large firms (Bernard et al. 2018). The concentration of benefits on a small set of firms solves collective action problems in support of trade liberalization, and relative to consumption products tilts the political environment against protectionism. Reinforcing these effects, and related to our argument, firm lobbying tends to be more effective for less visible policy issues, where policy-makers face fewer constraints from the public (Hillman and Hitt 1999). Of course, individual wholesalers and retailers have lobbied for lower tariffs on behalf of, and in concert with, consumers. An example is the efforts by U.S. retailer, JoAnn Fabrics, to rally support against tariffs during the U.S.-China trade war.[6] Yet, these cases are rare. For many consumer goods, firms are able to simply pass on the costs from higher tariffs (Amiti, Redding and Weinstein 2019) — reducing the incentives for firms to lobby for lower tariffs on these goods. For policy-makers pursuing a protectionist agenda, this implies greater constraints on higher tariffs on (less visible) intermediate inputs, and more political opportunities for tariffs on (visible) consumption products. We therefore expect that *women's representation is associated with higher tariffs on consumption products, and that this effect decreases for intermediate inputs.*

Women's Representation and Protectionism in Party Platforms

We begin by assessing the relationship between women in political parties and parties' trade preferences in three different samples. Our first analysis examines party platforms in 81 national elections across 20 advanced democracies from 1996-2017 (474 total party platforms).[7] We combine data on women's descriptive representation in parties' parliamentary delegations taken from Adams et al. (Forthcoming)[8]

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products at home in exchange for improved market access abroad, the higher credibility of trade policy choices in trade agreements is particularly attractive to multinationals (Pierce and Schott 2016), and thus draws their political support for lower tariffs on inputs.

[6]See, e.g., Bloomberg News, Retailer Joann Calls on Crafters to Oppose Trump's Tariffs, August 8, 2018. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing us to this case.

[7]Countries included are: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Importantly, while the national governments of EU member states do not make trade policy directly, control of the national government means seats on the European Council, which endows parties with the power to propose European Commissioners. In other words, national government control grants EU trade policy influence.

[8]Data on women's representation comes from the previous election. For example, for the 2013 German parliamentary election, data on the gender composition of political parties is taken from 2009.

with estimates of parties' trade preferences based on content codings of their electoral manifestos provided by Volkens et al. (2020). Following Lowe et al. (2011), we aggregate all positive and negative statements regarding trade, where higher values reflect a preference for greater trade restrictions (including domestic protections, quotas, tariffs, etc.).

We estimate OLS models using party platforms as our unit of analysis and constraining estimates to within-election (e.g., Israel 1996) variation using fixed effects. This holds constant the effect of potential confounders varying over time and space (e.g., trade integration, unemployment) on both predictor *and* outcome, identifying the estimate only with variation in women's representation and trade preferences *across* parties *within* a given election. We also distinguish between mainstream and "niche" parties, as niche parties are substantially more likely to make hostility toward trade (and immigration) a central focus of their platforms.[9]

The results in Table 1 support our first expectation. We find a significant, positive association between women's representation and the level of protectionism in the party's platform. The effect of increasing the proportion of women in the party by 20 percentage points (i.e., from 30% of the legislative delegation to 50%) is 0.12, which is larger than the difference between the 50th and 75th percentile on the dependent variable.

Comparing parties in national elections across space and time suggests that women are influencing the platforms of their parties, making them more protectionist on average. At the same time, these results are subject to typical concerns about design and inference. We thus supplement the cross-national results with two additional analyses, drawing on the 2014 European Parliamentary (EP) election and elections in post-war Sweden. Studying the EP election allows us to observe multiple parties within several countries competing in a *single contest* for the same policy authority.[10] The Swedish case allows us to estimate a causal effect, via difference-in-differences, of the imposition of a gender parity rule by three major parties.

We once again combine information on parties' stated trade preferences with information on women's descriptive representation. For the EP, data on women's representation come from Aldrich (2020), who measures women's share of the party list. Euromanifesto data come from Schmitt et al. (2016) and

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[9]Following Meguid (2005), we identify niche parties with the Manifesto Project's "party family" variable, including: "agrarian," "ethnic and regional," "nationalist," and "special issue" parties. See Appendix SI.3 for models including estimates of the parties' general economic and social preferences.

[10]2014 is the only election after the EP gained its current role in the making of trade policy for which manifesto data are presently available.

protectionist trade positions are measured as above.[11] Swedish quota data are taken from IDEA (2009). Quotas mandating gender parity ("50/50" split) in party lists were adopted by the Social Democratic Party and the Left Party in 1993 and by the Green Party in 1997; the remaining parties (Centre, Christian Democrats, Moderates, New Democrats, People's Party, and the Sweden Democrats) are the control group.[12] Here, we again use manifesto codings from Volkens et al. (2020) to measure preferences for protectionism and we analyze parties' positions in 23 elections between 1944 and 2018.

As before, results are found in Table 1. These analyses further support the expectation that women's representation increases parties' preferred level of protectionism. The 2014 EP analysis, which constrains estimates to within-country variation, shows a significant and positive association between women's representation on party lists and protectionism. In this case, the effect of increasing the proportion of women in the party by 20 percentage points is 0.31, which is larger than the difference between the 50th and 80th percentile on the dependent variable. For the Swedish study, we apply the typical two-way (party and year) fixed effects specification. The estimate shows evidence for a positive, causal effect of the gender parity rule on protectionism — once women are granted equal representation within parties, their parties' policy preferences grow significantly more protectionist ($p = 0.06$, two-way test). The effect of the quota, about 0.31, is larger than the difference between the 50th and 90th percentile on the dependent variable. Taken together, these three analyses provide strong evidence that women's presence in parties' legislative delegations drives those parties to adopt more protectionist trade policy.[13]

Women's Representation and Protectionist Tariffs

We next assess whether women's representation in government is associated with more protectionist policy choices. The analysis combines data on women's political representation with tariffs at the level of Broad Economic Categories (BEC) for 141 countries from 1991-2019.[14] We focus on representation in the legislature (using log-transformed seat shares) and in the executive (using the log-transformed share

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[11]We combine anti-free trade vectors $per_{v1}406a$, $per_{v2}406a$, and $per_{v3}406a$ with pro-free trade vectors $per_{v1}406b$, $per_{v2}406b$, and $per_{v3}406b$.

[12]These parties also adopted informal, internal quotas in 1978 and 1981. Using these dates recovers similar estimates, but we focus on formal policy implementation, as these quotas had "teeth" (O'Brien and Rickne 2016). The Moderates also adopted a gender quota, but not parity and only for EP elections.

[13]We note that the Swedish design yields the largest relative standard error estimate. This may be a function of the sharper design, as noted by an anonymous reviewer, but is also attributable to less observed variability in both the outcome and predictor in the Swedish analysis.

[14]See SI.1 for more information. We obtain similar results when disaggregating the data to Harmonised System six-digit products.

Table 1 Women's representation within parties and protectionism in party platforms

	National Elections	European Election	Sweden
Women's share of party seats	.620*** (.212)		
Women's share of party list		1.568** (.754)	
Gender parity quota			.312* (.166)
Niche Party	.219** (.093)	.714*** (.185)	
Fixed effects	Election	Country	Party, year
Observations	425	102	137
R^2	.176	.511	.430

Larger values of the dependent variable indicates stronger support for trade barriers. Coefficient estimates, standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% in a two-tailed test.

of women in the cabinet), taken from Hughes et al. (2019) and Nyrup and Bramwell (2020).[15] Because we posit differential effects for women's representation for consumption products and intermediate inputs, we distinguish between the two product categories using the BEC classification with a dummy variable, derived from end-use classifications from the System of National Accounts (United Nations Department of Statistics and Social Affairs 2002).[16] Accordingly, our data set is in the country-year-product category format. The dependent variable is the (log-transformed) applied tariff rate from the World Bank's World Integrated Trade Solution.

We estimate linear regression models, with standard errors clustered by country. All models include logged GDP, GDP per capita, unemployment rates, and polity scores. All models also include year and country fixed effects. Our research design thus takes advantage of country-specific changes in women's political representation over time, and assesses their differential effects across product types, while accounting for global trends in women's representation and tariff rates. We can therefore rule out that our results are driven by country-specific preferences for—or global trends toward—protectionism and women's representation.

Table 2 reports results for the association between women's representation and tariff rates. Odd columns report results for legislatures, even columns for executives. The findings suggest that a higher share of

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[15]We log the variables, following Betz, Fortunato and O'Brien (2021), to capture decreasing returns to scale. For all variables, we replace zeros with small positive numbers to allow for the log-transformation. We obtain nearly identical substantive results when using untransformed variables.

[16]We consider capital goods as part of intermediate inputs and drop three ambiguous categories.

women legislators and cabinet members translates into more protectionist trade policy on higher-visibility consumption products. As posited, this effect does not hold for lower-visibility intermediate inputs, which are also subject to greater lobbying for trade liberalization. Columns 1 and 2 present the results from the base model, with the control variables mentioned above included. An increase in women's legislative seat shares of 10% is associated with an increase in tariff rates of about 1.40%. For cabinet members, the effect is about half as large, with an increase of about .72%. At the same time, the interaction terms indicate that women's representation has small and statistically insignificant effects on the tariff rates of intermediate inputs (p-value of .71 for legislatures, .21 for cabinet members).

The remaining models indicate similar effects. Columns 3 and 4 show the results when incorporating political variables: the electoral rule, system of government, and partisanship of the largest party in government[17] (from Cruz, Keefer and Scartascini 2021). In columns 5 and 6, we include secondary school enrollment, to capture skill levels of the work force (from the World Bank); the Women, Business, and Law Index, an index of eight indicators of how legal rules shape women's economic opportunities (from the World Bank); and women's labor market participation (from the International Labour Organization), to account for the correlation between women's participation in economic and political markets. The substantive results hold: women's representation has positive effects on the tariff rates of consumption products, small and statistically insignificant effects on the tariff rates of intermediate inputs, and the difference between the two effects remains statistically significant. Consistent with our emphasis on the role of politically influential pro-trade firms, and confirming earlier work, the results also show that intermediate inputs indeed have lower tariffs than consumption goods.

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[17]Non-classified parties are the omitted category.

Table 2   Women's representation and protectionism in trade policy

	Country FE		Political Institutions		Socio-Economic Factors	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Log seat share women	.14***		.11*		.19***	
	(.040)		(.059)		(.047)	
x intermediate inputs	-.15***		-.15***		-.17***	
	(.025)		(.040)		(.026)	
Log cabinet share women		.072**		.092***		.066**
		(.029)		(.030)		(.033)
x intermediate inputs		-.11***		-.085***		-.11***
		(.029)		(.028)		(.030)
Intermediate inputs	-1.23***	-1.15***	-1.24***	-1.13***	-1.28***	-1.18***
	(.063)	(.075)	(.084)	(.073)	(.071)	(.082)
Polity score	-.082	-.11	-.23*	-.25*	-.11	-.14
	(.117)	(.108)	(.127)	(.127)	(.120)	(.116)
Log GDP	-.036	-.047	-.093	-.12	-.13	-.19
	(.201)	(.178)	(.259)	(.249)	(.266)	(.244)
GDP per capita	-.22	-.18	-.24	-.18	-.45**	-.44**
	(.175)	(.187)	(.210)	(.215)	(.212)	(.219)
Unemployment rate	-.60	-1.22	-1.33	-1.73	-.84	-1.43
	(1.862)	(1.807)	(1.923)	(1.821)	(2.058)	(1.941)
Right-wing party			.25**	.28**		
			(.116)	(.111)		
Center party			.40*	.44**		
			(.221)	(.216)		
Left-wing party			.17	.18*		
			(.113)	(.107)		
Plurality rule			-.16	-.17		
			(.181)	(.168)		
Presidential system			-.011	.097		
			(.132)	(.162)		
Secondary school enrollment					-.004	-.003
					(.005)	(.005)
Women, Business, and Law Index					-.011	-.009
					(.007)	(.007)
Women's labor force participation					-.032**	-.030**
					(.013)	(.012)
Constant	4.35	4.50	5.64	6.29	9.30	10.2*
	(4.916)	(4.332)	(6.315)	(6.053)	(6.746)	(6.173)
Number Obs.	36,338	36,335	32,246	31,973	25,195	25,579
R2	.490	.492	.498	.503	.435	.433
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Coefficient estimates, standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

The appendix includes a series of additional results, three of which we highlight here. First, in SI.4, we present results from additional fixed effects specifications, such as including fixed effects for higher-order BEC groups (e.g. "food and beverages");[18] fixed effects for each product category; and country-year fixed effects. The results remain robust to these demanding fixed effects models. Second, in SI.5, we account for demand-driven explanations of protectionism and women's representation, showing that our results are robust to import shocks and to limiting the sample to years after 2001, when the "China shock" led to a

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[18]These results allow us to identify the estimates from the difference between consumption products and intermediate inputs within, for example, the category of "food and beverages."

protectionist turn across countries (Colantone and Stanig 2018). Drawing on survey data from Pew, we also show that our results are not explained by a growing preference for protectionist policies in the population. Third, in SI.6, we show that consumption products and intermediate products do not differ systematically in their reliance on women as employees, suggesting that our results reflect support for protectionist trade policy that extends beyond its immediate labor market impact on women.

Conclusion

One of the most consistent findings in the scholarship on gender and political economy is that women are more protectionist than men. Our analyses show that these well-documented gender differences in the trade preferences of the mass public also manifest in parties' policy platforms and ultimately in trade policy outcomes. We also identify limits to these effects, which are plausibly driven by opposition from business groups to protectionist policies on intermediate inputs, as well as the fact that citizens are less likely to recognize and reward protectionism on less visible products.

For gender and politics scholars, our results contribute to a large body of work linking women's descriptive and substantive representation. Taking the novel approach of examining both party platforms and government behavior — and considering a large set of countries over time — our letter suggests that women's presence "matters" even on issues that are not overtly gendered. Likewise, for political economy researchers, the different effects for consumer goods and intermediate inputs provide further evidence that distinct factors explain trade policy choices across these product categories.

Our study also has implications for future research. It is notable, for example, that gender gaps in trade preferences survive selection into legislative and executive seats, where gender differences in knowledge and risk acceptance are muted or reversed,[19] implying that — at least among politicians— knowledge- and risk-driven explanations for the gender gap in trade preferences do not hold. Future work may incorporate this insight, and should also assess whether the patterns we observe can be explained by women elites holding more (sincere, or personal) protectionist preferences—for example, as an ecologically rational response to asymmetric costs and benefits of globalization—or their efforts to represent the interests of women in the electorate (or some combination of these two factors).

More generally, our work demonstrates that studying international political economy through a gendered

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[19]Women politicians are as (or more) educated (O'Brien and Rickne 2016) and risk acceptant as their male counterparts.

lens is necessary for understanding both the implications of an increasingly integrated global political economy and its interplay with enduring domestic (gender) inequalities in representation. Future studies should continue to assess the gendered effects of trade policy and gender differences in behavior among producers, consumers, and policy-makers. Political scientists should pay special attention to how inequalities in representation can yield inequalities in the distribution of the costs and benefits of globalization via government policy. Building on this study, for example, scholars could examine the link between women's representation and the removal of barriers faced by women entrepreneurs in accessing markets. Still other work could ask whether tariffs disproportionately favor men and industries with large shares of male employees. With both the sustainability of globalization and the need for more egalitarian representation in political institutions increasingly becoming pressing societal concerns, understanding these links between representation and globalization will only become more important over time.

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Online Appendix for "Do Women Make More Protectionist Trade Policy?"

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SI.1 TRADE POLICY DATA DESCRIPTION

The data set for the trade policy analyses is in the country-year-product category format, with product categories defined by categories in the Broad Economic Categories (BEC). The BEC distinguishes between 19 product categories and assigns, based on the System of National Accounts, end-use categories: household consumption products, intermediate inputs, and capital goods.[20] We consider capital goods as part of intermediate inputs, given that they are largely used as inputs for firms. Three product categories are indeterminate and therefore dropped from the data set, leaving 16 product categories for each country-year. Of these, 6 are consumption products. We create a dummy variable indicating all goods that are not consumption products.

Our outcome variable is the tariff rate, which is specific to each country-year and product category. It therefore varies across all three dimensions in our data set. Our main predictors are variables on women's representation in legislatures and executives, which is constant within country-years but varies across countries and, within countries, across years. We evaluate the effect of changes in women's representation and how this effect varies across product categories. For this, we use data on the product type, as described above, which varies across product categories but is constant across countries and across years. Figure SI.1 displays the distribution of the outcome variable, tariff rates, and the variables for women's representation in legislatures and executives, in our sample.

FIGURE SI.1 Distribution of outcome variable, tariff rates, and predictors women's seat shares in legislatures and women's seat shares in cabinets. Variables already transformed using the log.

The sample includes up to 141 countries, from 1991 to 2019. We drop European Union members from the sample — instead including the European Union as a single entity — given that in the entire sample period trade policy was outside the political control of individual member states.

Our main specifications include two types of fixed effects. First, we include year fixed effects, which control for global, year-specific changes in both representation and tariff rates. In particular, they control for global movements toward women's representation and global declines in tariff rates across countries. Second, we include country fixed effects, which control for country-specific attributes that are associated with both tariff rates and women's representation. For example, these fixed effects capture that countries

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[20]As we show below, we obtain similar results when using data in the Harmonised System format, at the level of six digits, which distinguishes among approximately 5,000 products.

with more egalitarian norms might have higher support for both (government intervention through) protectionist trade policies and higher shares of women in political office, as long as these country-specific attributes are constant over time. Note that the moderator, the dummy for the product type, is constant over time and years, and only varies across product categories, such that it is not affected by these fixed effects.

As a consequence of this fixed effects modeling strategy, our results exploit (i) *country-specific* changes in representation over time that (ii) *differ from global trends* in representation, and we assess how these changes in representation have (iii) differential effects across product categories. We can therefore rule out a large class of omitted variables as driving our results. Our results do not reflect a global move toward protectionism in recent years that coincided with gains in women's representation, for example, because we control for global trends over time and because we examine a differential effect across product categories; nor do our results reflect any country-specific differences in both representation and trade policy, because we control for these through country fixed effects and because we examine a differential effect across product categories.

SI.2 THE GENDER GAP IN ELITES' TRADE PREFERENCES

We assume that the well-documented gender gap in preferences for trade protectionism in the mass public carries over into elites, specifically women in parties and government. We are agnostic about the roots of the gendered differences in trade preferences among elites: women politicians may themselves hold more protectionist preferences or may be seeking to represent the more protectionist preferences of women in the electorate. Our results should hold as long as the gender gap in the mass public translates to the elite level. We offer three supplementary analyses in support of this assumption.

First, we gather all roll call votes taken on free trade agreements in the U.S. House for the $108^{th} - 112^{th}$ Congresses (32 total votes). These data allow us to observe whether women and men in the House express differing levels of support for trade liberalization. We code each vote on each bill such that 1 indicates the protectionist position and 0 indicates the free trade position. We regress these votes on Congress members' gender in bivariate regressions and expand the model to account for potential confounders, adding state and year fixed effects, and then several control variables capturing relevant district-level features (percentage of workforce employed in manufacturing and employed in services) and representatives' characteristics (party, age, and experience in number of congressional terms). Our expectation is that the analyses will recover a positive estimate on the indicator for women representatives, suggesting that women are, on average, more protectionist in their voting on free trade agreements. The results are given in table SI.1 below.

Table SI.1 Effect of gender on protectionism in free trade agreement roll call votes in the US House ($108^{th} - 112^{th}$ Congresses).

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Woman	0.130***	0.116***	0.028*
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.017)
FEs		✓	✓
Controls			✓
Observations	4,606	4,606	4,606
R^2	0.009	0.134	0.404
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Each model recovers the expected positive correlation, showing that women are more protectionist

in roll call voting on free trade agreements in the US House during this period. This relationship is substantially attenuated by the inclusion of an indicator of partisanship (column 3), but still persists in the expected direction. A large portion of this attenuation is due to differences in partisan management of roll call discipline. Only one free trade agreement was considered in the 108th or 109th Sessions when the Democrats were in control. This means that nearly all roll calls were taken under Republican majorities. As such, there is almost no gender variation in voting behavior *within* Republican members—majorities, particularly weak majorities, as the Republicans were throughout most of this period—must insist on discipline from their members. But still, the overall correlation persists, driven primarily by variability in the voting behavior across gender within the Democratic party. Given that these effects are still detectable after legislative agenda gate-keeping and whipping by party leadership, we find this to be fairly compelling evidence that the gender gap in trade preferences among the mass public survives selection into political office.

Second, we gather surveys of members of the European Parliament conducted in 2000, 2006, and 2010 by Hix et al. (2016). In these surveys, MEPs were asked whether they {*strongly disagree* = 5; *disagree* = 4; *neither* = 3; *agree* = 2; *strongly agree* = 1} with these statements: "The EU should promote global free trade at all costs;" "The EU should abide by all World Trade Organization rules and rulings;" and "All trade barriers between the EU and the USA should be abolished." We aggregate these responses into a single (equal weights) index $\in (0, 1)$ of expressed preferences for protectionism and regress these preferences on the MEPs' gender. As above, we regress these preferences on the gender of the candidate in a bivariate model and then expand the model to account for potential confounders, adding year fixed effects, and then controlling for member party (there are 12 EP party groups) and their general left-right policy preferences.

Table SI.2   Effect of gender on expressed protectionism in MEP surveys in 2000, 2006, 2010.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Woman	0.032	0.042**	0.036**
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.018)
FEs		✓	✓
Controls			✓
Observations	518	518	510
R^2	0.005	0.033	0.279
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

The results are given in Table SI.2 and while the estimate in the bivariate model falls just short of traditional significance thresholds ($p = 0.11$), the models with unit fixed effects and control variables yield efficient estimates of the expected correlation.

Third, we gather data from the Comparative Candidate Survey (Module 2), which includes survey responses from over 6,000 candidates across EU 14 countries.[21] In these modules, candidates competing in the national parliamentary election are asked about their policy preferences. Trade is not asked about directly, but there are two questions related to trade that we index in order to proxy for candidates' trade preferences. The first asks candidates whether their country's membership in the EU is a "good thing." We note that the free movement of goods across national borders within the union is perhaps the most consequential aspect of EU membership. Candidates are allowed three responses: that membership is good,

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[21]Countries included are Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany (two waves), Greece, Hungary, Montenegro (two waves), Portugal, Spain, and Sweden.

neither good nor bad, or bad. We code these responses such that $\{bad = 1; neither = 0.5; good = 0\}$. Higher values should thus positively correlate to protectionism. The second question asks whether candidates agree that governments should abstain from intervening in the economy. Tariffs are government interventions that shape production and consumption patterns by making imported goods more or less attractive. Allowed responses range from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree" (5 point scale) and we recode the responses such that $\{strongly\ disagree = 1; disagree = 0.75; neither = 0.5; agree = 0.25; strongly\ agree = 0\}$. Higher values should thus positively correlate to protectionism.

While this is an imperfect proxy, it is one that we can evaluate empirically, as the MEP surveys also ask these questions in addition to the questions probing trade preferences directly that we modeled in the above analysis. In the MEP survey, the direct measure and the proxy measure are correlated at $\beta = 0.214; p < 0.001$. Further, the measures behave similarly when modeled on gender. Table SI.3 regresses the direct protectionism measure on the proxy (column 1), then compares the two by estimating the same fully specified model from the above analysis on both the direct measure (column 2) and the proxy (column 3). The analyses make us more confident in the quality of this measure.

Table SI.3 Comparing direct protectionist sentiment to proxied protectionism in the MEP surveys.

	y=Protectionism	y=Protectionism	y=Proxy
Proxy	0.214***		
	(0.050)		
Woman		0.036**	0.026*
		(0.018)	(0.013)
FEs		✓	✓
Controls		✓	✓
Observations	508	510	696
R^2	0.035	0.279	0.285
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Recorded responses to the two questions that compose the proxy in the CCS data are averaged to create our proxy for protectionist preferences. We regress these preferences on the gender of the candidate in a bivariate model and then expand the model to account for potential confounders, adding country-year fixed effects, and then controlling for candidate age and party (there are 124 observed election-parties total). The expectation is a positive estimate on the indicator for women candidates. The results are given in table SI.4 below.

Each model recovers the expected correlation between gender and the protectionism proxy—women candidates are more protectionist than their male counterparts, even after accounting for party. Taken together with the analyses above, we are thus comfortable assuming that the well-documented gender gap in preferences for trade protectionism in the mass public carries over into elites, specifically women in parties and government.

Table SI.4 Effect of gender on (proxied) preferences for protectionism in CCS Module 2.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Woman	0.040***	0.019***	0.008*
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)
FEs		✓	✓
Controls			✓
Observations	6,192	6,192	5,942
R^2	0.006	0.128	0.541
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

SI.3 MANIFESTO ANALYSES

Below we estimate models that account for the non-trade preferences of the parties included in our election manifestos analyses. To this end, we calculate parties' espoused preferences for general economic policy (central planning, redistribution, labor policy, etc.) and social policy (traditional morality, law and order, etc.) from the same manifesto codings we use to derive our measure of trade policy preferences. Following Lowe et al. (2011), we take the logged ratio of right to left-leaning statements using the following issue codings:

Table SI.5 Policy dimensions for economic and social preferences

	Economic	Social
Left	403, 404, 412, 413, 504, 506, 701	103, 105, 106, 107
Right	401, 402, 414, 505	104, 201, 203, 305, 601, 603, 606, 606

These economic and social policy preferences are then included in supplementary models in Table SI.6 below. The models show that our central results remain in the predicted direction and statistically significant, although they are somewhat attenuated by the inclusion of estimates of economic and social policy stands. This is almost certainly due to collider bias: as women's presence in parties predicts those parties' trade preferences *and* their preferences for economic and social policy (as shown by Greene and O'Brien 2016), inclusion of economic and social policy preferences *should* attenuate the central result.

Table SI.6 Women's representation within parties and protectionism in party platforms. Accounting for general economic and social preferences.

	National Elections			European Election			Sweden	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Women's share of party seats	0.629***	0.397*	0.417*					
	(0.212)	(0.217)	(0.220)					
Women's share of party list				1.568**	1.378*	1.389*		
				(0.754)	(0.756)	(0.760)		
Gender parity quota							0.312*	0.301*
							(0.166)	(0.168)
Economic preferences		−0.152***	−0.142***		−0.152**	−0.167**		−0.048
		(0.032)	(0.036)		(0.064)	(0.070)		(0.044)
Social preferences		0.026	0.028		0.023	0.018		0.045
		(0.035)	(0.035)		(0.133)	(0.134)		(0.040)
Niche parties	0.226**	0.235***	0.243***	0.714***	0.625***	0.685***		
	(0.091)	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.185)	(0.192)	(0.221)		
Socialist and other left parties			0.077			−0.224		
			(0.125)			(0.402)		
Fixed effects	Election	Election	Election	Country	Country	Country	Party, year	Party, year
Observations	425	425	425	102	102	102	137	137
R^2	0.297	0.341	0.342	0.511	0.546	0.548	0.430	0.441

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

SI.4   FIXED EFFECTS SPECIFICATIONS

Our main models include country- and year-fixed effects. In Table SI.7, we present three additional sets of fixed effects specifications. First, we include fixed effects for the higher-order categories in BEC (e.g., "food and beverages"), which we label BEC groups in the table. These allow us to distinguish, for example, between consumption products and intermediate inputs within the category of "food and beverages." Second, we include fixed effects for each BEC product category (and as a consequence, the intermediate input dummy drops out). Third, we include country-year fixed effects. Here, most variables drop out, because they are invariant at the country-year level, but the model remains suitable to evaluate the conditional hypothesis. That the results remain even in these demanding fixed effects specifications further reassures us that they are not merely a (spurious) correlation.

Table SI.7 Fixed Effects Specifications

	BEC group FE		BEC category FE		Country-year FE	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Log seat share women	.14***		.14***		.	
	(.040)		(.040)		(.)	
x intermediate inputs	-.15***		-.15***		-.15***	
	(.025)		(.025)		(.026)	
Log cabinet share women		.072**		.072**		.
		(.029)		(.029)		(.)
x intermediate inputs		-.11***		-.11***		-.11***
		(.029)		(.029)		(.029)
Intermediate inputs	-.63***	-.57***	.	.	-1.23***	-1.15***
	(.064)	(.071)	(.)	(.)	(.065)	(.077)
Polity score	-.083	-.11	-.083	-.11	.	.
	(.117)	(.108)	(.117)	(.108)	(.)	(.)
Log GDP	-.033	-.043	-.030	-.040	.	.
	(.201)	(.178)	(.201)	(.178)	(.)	(.)
GDP per capita	-.22	-.18	-.22	-.18	.	.
	(.175)	(.187)	(.175)	(.187)	(.)	(.)
Unemployment rate	-.59	-1.21	-.59	-1.21	.	.
	(1.862)	(1.807)	(1.862)	(1.808)	(.)	(.)
Constant	4.40	4.52	4.21	4.34	2.22***	2.24***
	(4.918)	(4.330)	(4.926)	(4.341)	(.024)	(.025)
Number Obs.	36,338	36,335	36,338	36,335	36,338	36,335
R2	.572	.569	.592	.587	.570	.577
BEC Group FE	✓	✓				
BEC Category FE			✓	✓		
Country-Year FE					✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓		
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓		

Linear regression models with robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

SI.5 DEMAND FOR PROTECTIONISM

Some readers may posit that our results reflect a protectionist turn in the electorate. Anticipating that women behave in a more protectionist way, an increasingly protectionist electorate votes women into political office. This, in turn, causes trade barriers to rise. This effect is compatible with our argument and, in fact, subsumes it: in this explanation, women still make more protectionist policy. The explanation simply adds a step in which voters recognize and act upon the correlation between the gender of office-holders and their trade policy choices.

That being said, we can rule out that our results are wholly reflecting a protectionist turn in the electorate. In Table SI.8, we show that the results change little when limiting the sample to years after 2001, when China's entry into the World Trade Organization (the "China shock") led to a protectionist turn across countries (models 1 and 2); and when controlling for past annual changes in imports (models

3 and 4), using data from COMTRADE.

Additionally, in Table SI.9, we show a series of results suggesting that women are not more likely to gain political representation in countries that plausibly experience a protectionist turn in the electorate. As before, we present results for legislatures in odd columns, results for executives in even columns. First, in models 1 and 2, we show that in countries that experienced the largest decline in trade barriers in response to China's entry into the World Trade Organization, we observe no corresponding change in the representation of women. For this, we use the average bilateral tariff rate for imports from China, and for each country calculate the difference in the tariff rate in the four years before and the four years after China's entry into the World Trade Organization; we similarly calculate the change in women's representation for the same time period. This model has one observation for each country, and therefore includes no country fixed effects. Note that the change in the tariff rate toward China is largely exogenous to each country's policy choices in the years after 2001: the change comes about because of China's entry into the World Trade Organization, taking a country's policy choices toward China until 2001 as given.

Second, we show that in countries that experienced larger annual increases in imports in response to China's entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001, we observe no significant change in the representation of women (models 3 and 4). We use data from COMTRADE to calculate changes in bilateral imports, and limit the sample to years after 2001.

Third, we account for protectionist preferences in the electorate directly, showing that in countries where a larger share of the population views increasing trade negatively (as reported via the regularly conducted Pew Global Attitudes Surveys), women are not more likely to hold political office (models 5 and 6). For this, we gather the Pew Global Attitudes Surveys from 2007 through 2014 and calculate the share of respondents who view growing trade and business ties with other countries as 'somewhat bad' or 'very bad' (we obtain very similar results when instead using the average of the responses on the reported four-point scale). These data are available for 44 of the countries in our sample, frequently for several time periods, covering a total of over 200,000 survey participants.

All models include our standard control variables and, in the second and third set of results, country- and year fixed effects as well. We find statistically significant effects in none of the models, and the substantive size of the effect is negligible as well. The unconditional correlations, including in models without any fixed effects, are substantively similar; we also obtain similar results, indicating no association between protectionist pressures in the electorate and women's representation, when using first-differences for the outcome. In sum, a demand-driven explanation is compatible with the process we suggested, but does not appear to be the sole driver of the patterns we identified.

Table SI.8 Protectionist demands and trade policy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Log seat share women	.13***		.099**	
	(.040)		(.041)	
x intermediate inputs	-.15***		-.16***	
	(.027)		(.028)	
Log cabinet share women		.070**		.091***
		(.035)		(.029)
x intermediate inputs		-.12***		-.12***
		(.035)		(.035)
Intermediate inputs	-1.24***	-1.19***	-1.26***	-1.20***
	(.064)	(.084)	(.068)	(.085)
Polity score	-.11	-.15	-.11	-.12
	(.090)	(.090)	(.086)	(.091)
Log GDP	-.12	-.14	-.054	-.029
	(.214)	(.181)	(.333)	(.289)
GDP per capita	-.12	-.080	-.045	.041
	(.142)	(.151)	(.178)	(.175)
Unemployment rate	-1.43	-2.02	-.58	-1.20
	(2.475)	(2.532)	(1.937)	(1.998)
Lagged change in imports			.0002	.0006
			(.001)	(.001)
Constant	5.91	6.22	4.33	3.67
	(5.377)	(4.556)	(8.215)	(7.032)
Number Obs.	28,982	28,675	27,417	27,036
R2	.481	.481	.494	.504
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear regression models with robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table SI.9   Protectionist demands and women's representation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Change in tariff toward China	-.013	.004				
	(.022)	(.023)				
Change in imports from China			.0006	.0006		
			(.002)	(.002)		
Pew globalization attitudes					.41	-.25
					(.539)	(1.529)
Polity score	-.31**	.21*	-.16	.048	-.15	-1.23
	(.152)	(.118)	(.193)	(.239)	(.355)	(1.403)
Unemployment rate	.66	-.34	.96	-.41	-3.36	5.45
	(.874)	(1.195)	(1.162)	(1.889)	(3.232)	(10.182)
Log GDP	-.014	.028	.29	.83***	.042	.61
	(.029)	(.054)	(.245)	(.171)	(.380)	(.453)
GDP per capita	.035	-.016	-.45**	.079	-.59	1.51
	(.034)	(.065)	(.173)	(.234)	(.444)	(1.285)
Constant	.71	-.32	-9.20	-22.7***	-2.30	-19.8*
	(.670)	(1.278)	(5.964)	(4.143)	(9.885)	(11.726)
Number Obs.	96	100	1,611	1,603	142	144
R2	.096	.030	.815	.658	.930	.662
Year FE			✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE			✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear regression models with robust standard errors, clustered by country (except models 1 and 2), in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

SI.6   EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS

Men and women participate in the labor market at different rates and in different industries and occupations. They are therefore affected differently by tariff rates on individual products, and we might as a consequence expect a link between representation and tariff rates across products. We thus seek to rule out that our results capture differential rates of labor market participation between men and women and across industries and occupations. More generally, we note that while prior work has examined the consequences of trade liberalization for men and women (see, e.g., Autor, Dorn and Hanson 2019), we are not aware of any work that posits a relationship between gendered employment patterns across industries or occupations and tariff rates. We believe this to be an important topic for future research.

To rule out the possibility that gendered employment patterns explain our findings, we compare the employment share of women in different industries to whether these industries produce consumption products or intermediate inputs. We create two measures of the role of women employees in an industry: (i) the share of women employee's among an industry's total employees (as a measure of the reliance of each industry on women employees) and (ii) the share of an industry in employing a country's total number of women employees (as an indicator of the importance of an industry in employing women).

We draw on two data sources. Country-specific data at the two-digit level in the ISIC format are available from the International Labor Organisation (ILO). The advantage is that the data are country-specific: they are available for 106 countries in our sample. But the data are relatively aggregated, which introduces a considerable amount of uncertainty when linking it to the variable on consumption products and intermediate

inputs. To complement these data, we thus rely on employment data from the U.S., which are available at a lower level of aggregation, four-digit NAICS codes, through the Quarterly Workforce Indicators, QWI, from 2010-2015 (Do et al., 2016, for example, also use U.S. data to capture female-labor intensive goods worldwide). We link information from both data sets to the BEC format, using available concordances between ISIC/NAICS, the Harmonised System, and BEC. We note that these are still very coarse matches, due to the aggregated format of the BEC categories.

Table SI.10 displays the difference in means between consumption products and intermediate inputs, together with the p-value, for (i) the share of women employee's among an industry's total employees in the top panel and (ii) the share of an industry in employing a country's total number of women employees in the bottom panel, for the variables derived from the ILO data and from the QWI data. In the second column, we also control for product category fixed effects, using fixed effects for the higher-order categories in the BEC (e.g., "food and beverages").[22]

We overall find little evidence that the share of women employees is significantly different for consumption products and intermediate inputs. Only in one of the eight models, when using U.S. employment data on the share of women employee's among an industry's total employees and when not including the product category fixed effects, do we find a statistically significant difference. When including product group fixed effects, the difference becomes substantively negligible in this model as well. We thus find only limited evidence to suggest that gendered employment patterns explain the results reported in the paper, and leave it to future research to examine the link between representation, gendered employment patterns, and trade policy more fully.

Table SI.10   Employment patterns

	Unconditional	BEC group FE
Women share in industry employement		
ILO data	0.083	.036
	(.056)	(.027)
U.S. data	.089***	.017
	(.027)	(.012)
Industry share in women employment		
ILO data	-.003	.012
	(.030)	(.020)
U.S. data	.020	.016
	(.018)	(.032)

Difference in means in gendered employment between consumption products and intermediates, unconditional (left column) and conditional on BEC group fixed effects (right column), together with standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by BEC product category. Cross-country data from the International Labor Organisation, U.S. Data from Quarterly Workforce Indicators, matched to BEC data.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

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[22]Including, for example, country fixed effects for the sample with ILO data leaves the results virtually unchanged, because the product category variable is not correlated with country fixed effects.

SI.7 ADDITIONAL MODELS

Table SI.11 makes several modifications to the base model with country and year fixed effects, for representation in the legislature (odd columns) and the executive (even columns). We restrict the sample to countries that were democracies for at least part of the sample period; we include the percent of the urban population, given that the beneficiaries of trade liberalization tend to be located in urban centers and that urbanization is likely correlated with women's representation; and, we include variables for economic crises (defined as a reduction in GDP of at least 3 percent) and for exchange rate crisis (defined as a country-specific two-standard deviation change from the mean in the exchange rate). The substantive results remain the same in all of these models.

Table SI.11 Additional Models

	Democracies		Urban population		Crises	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Log seat share women	.18**		.14***		.14***	
	(.088)		(.040)		(.040)	
x intermediate inputs	-.20***		-.15***		-.15***	
	(.054)		(.025)		(.025)	
Log cabinet share women		.057*		.073**		.073**
		(.030)		(.030)		(.029)
x intermediate inputs		-.098***		-.11***		-.11***
		(.033)		(.029)		(.029)
Intermediate inputs	-1.39***	-1.21***	-1.23***	-1.15***	-1.23***	-1.16***
	(.112)	(.090)	(.063)	(.075)	(.064)	(.076)
Polity score	-.17	-.19	-.082	-.11	-.085	-.12
	(.146)	(.132)	(.118)	(.110)	(.115)	(.106)
Log GDP	-.27	-.78***	-.052	-.073	-.031	-.059
	(.472)	(.254)	(.231)	(.198)	(.210)	(.183)
GDP per capita	-.46**	-.60***	-.21	-.16	-.23	-.18
	(.217)	(.207)	(.181)	(.195)	(.180)	(.189)
Unemployment rate	-1.09	-1.24	-.64	-1.29	-.45	-1.06
	(2.603)	(2.384)	(1.902)	(1.829)	(1.883)	(1.823)
Urban population			.0036	.0080		
			(.020)	(.020)		
Economic crisis					-.10	-.091
					(.114)	(.112)
x-rate crisis					.043	.032
					(.128)	(.134)
Constant	10.2	22.5***	4.54	4.72	4.23	4.76
	(11.669)	(6.357)	(5.213)	(4.468)	(5.124)	(4.438)
Number Obs.	23,114	23,242	36,338	36,335	35,474	35,935
R2	.388	.388	.490	.492	.493	.493
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear regression models with robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table SI.12 displays the results when replicating the main models with untransformed seat shares and cabinet shares. The results remain very similar, with positive effects for consumption goods and an offsetting interaction for intermediate inputs. Only in column 3 is the term on seat shares in the legislature no longer significant at the 5% level.

Table SI.12 Untransformed variables: seat shares and cabinet shares

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Seat share women	1.13**		.84*		1.49***	
	(.436)		(.485)		(.527)	
x intermediate inputs	-1.30***		-1.19***		-1.39***	
	(.322)		(.331)		(.366)	
Cabinet share women		.64**		.71**		.75**
		(.311)		(.297)		(.350)
x intermediate inputs		-1.21***		-1.02***		-1.26***
		(.296)		(.288)		(.321)
Intermediate inputs	-.70***	-.73***	-.74***	-.80***	-.69***	-.73***
	(.069)	(.057)	(.072)	(.059)	(.075)	(.062)
Polity score	-.088	-.11	-.23*	-.25*	-.12	-.14
	(.117)	(.109)	(.128)	(.127)	(.121)	(.116)
Log GDP	-.028	-.053	-.090	-.12	-.090	-.19
	(.201)	(.180)	(.258)	(.253)	(.261)	(.245)
GDP per capita	-.23	-.18	-.24	-.18	-.48**	-.44**
	(.175)	(.188)	(.209)	(.221)	(.210)	(.221)
Unemployment rate	-.58	-1.24	-1.33	-1.76	-.84	-1.42
	(1.857)	(1.814)	(1.915)	(1.842)	(2.072)	(1.949)
Right-wing party			.25**	.27**		
			(.116)	(.111)		
Center party			.40*	.43**		
			(.218)	(.215)		
Left-wing party			.17	.18*		
			(.112)	(.105)		
Plurality rule			-.17	-.17		
			(.174)	(.171)		
Presidential system			-.012	.10		
			(.132)	(.162)		
Secondary school enrollment					-.005	-.003
					(.005)	(.005)
Women, Business, and Law Index					-.011	-.009
					(.007)	(.007)
Women labor force participation					-.030**	-.030**
					(.013)	(.012)
Constant	3.68	4.38	5.20	5.95	7.77	10.0
	(4.907)	(4.376)	(6.237)	(6.140)	(6.577)	(6.152)
Number Obs.	36,338	36,335	32,246	31,973	25,195	25,579
R2	.490	.493	.498	.503	.434	.434
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear regression models with robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

In Table SI.13, we present results for models that interact all predictor variables (except for the fixed effects, in which case we would have split sample models), for seat shares in columns 1 and 2 and for cabinet shares in columns 3 and 4. To facilitate interpretation, we present the effect sizes split into two columns. Odd columns present the effect sizes for consumption products, even columns for intermediate inputs (the interaction terms themselves are omitted). We obtain similar results as before for seat shares in the legislature, but not for women in the cabinet. Here, the pattern of the coefficients remains, but the coefficient on cabinet shares loses statistical significance for consumption products.

Table SI.13   Fully interacted models

	Seat shares		Cabinet shares	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Consumption	Intermediates	Consumption	Intermediates
Log seat share women	.11***	-.002		
	(.039)	(.038)		
Log cabinet share women			.039	-.015
			(.028)	(.028)
Intermediate inputs	-1.09***		-.83*	
	(.383)		(.421)	
Polity score	.043	-.16	.039	-.20*
	(.123)	(.119)	(.119)	(.109)
Log GDP	-.042	-.034	-.049	-.047
	(.201)	(.200)	(.179)	(.178)
GDP per capita	-.19	-.23	-.15	-.19
	(.173)	(.177)	(.185)	(.189)
Unemployment rate	.48	-1.24	-.18	-1.84
	(1.908)	(1.862)	(1.849)	(1.809)
Constant	4.28	3.19	4.31	3.48
	(4.932)	(4.908)	(4.339)	(4.338)
Number Obs.	36,338		36,335	
R2	.493		.495	
Year FE	✓		✓	
Country FE	✓		✓	

Linear regression models with robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses. Each set of columns represents one model, with all predictor variables (except fixed effects) interacted with product category.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

SI.8 DIFFERENT MEASURES OF PROTECTIONISM

Table SI.14 presents results for three alternative dependent variables: when using most-favored nation tariff rates (columns 1-2); when using logged import values (columns 3-4) as a measure of de facto protection; and when using tariff rates at the Harmonised System six-digit level (columns 5-6). As before, we replicate our base model with country and year fixed effects. With one exception—when looking at aggregate imports and legislative seat shares, in column 3—the results are consistent with the prior findings.

Table SI.14   Different Measures of Protectionism

	MFN Tariffs		Imports		HS 6-digit	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Log seat share women	.12***		-.004		.19**	
	(.032)		(.033)		(.076)	
x intermediate inputs	-.13***		.007		-.29***	
	(.023)		(.040)		(.072)	
Log cabinet share women		.083***		.092***		.22***
		(.029)		(.029)		(.060)
x intermediate inputs		-.094***		-.11***		-.29***
		(.027)		(.036)		(.066)
Intermediate inputs	-1.20***	-1.12***	.38***	.12	-2.19***	-2.25***
	(.059)	(.069)	(.101)	(.094)	(.186)	(.191)
Polity score	-.061	-.086	.11	.16**	-.23	-.25
	(.114)	(.107)	(.070)	(.073)	(.217)	(.204)
Log GDP	-.015	-.0100	.90***	.74***	-.57	-.44
	(.181)	(.164)	(.112)	(.159)	(.366)	(.337)
GDP per capita	-.21	-.20	-.17***	-.17***	-.0094	.054
	(.166)	(.171)	(.051)	(.051)	(.249)	(.249)
Unemployment rate	-.73	-1.04	-.86	-.69	.73	-.13
	(1.796)	(1.721)	(.704)	(.686)	(2.869)	(2.719)
Constant	3.78	3.61	-10.8***	-6.64*	17.2*	14.2*
	(4.433)	(3.976)	(2.722)	(3.844)	(9.056)	(8.279)
Number Obs.	36,592	36,496	35,725	35,947	9,166,556	9,142,842
R2	.533	.536	.618	.598	.349	.357
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear regression models with robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.